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Abstract 
We test the strategic motive to sell forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and 
quadropoly environments with either a finite (exogenous close) or an infinite 
(endogenous close) number of forward markets. In the exogenous close case 
experienced subjects do not avail themselves of the forward markets and production 
mostly occurs in the spot market phase. In a forward market duopoly experienced 
subjects achieve nearly the monopoly output level. For the quadropoly output levels are 
more competitive and are near the Cournot Nash equilibrium. In both cases output 
produced is much less than the Allaz-Vila (1993) prediction. The results with 
inexperienced subjects, however, are in line with theory and as reported in Le-Coq and 
Orzen (2006). We implement the case of infinitely many forward periods using the 
endogenous close rule. In this case the results both for a forward market duopoly and 
quadropoly are much more competitive both with inexperienced and experienced 
subjects. Unlike the exogenous stopping rule, under the endogenous rule subjects sell 
forward in the forward markets and find it hard to coordinate their actions. 
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1. Introduction 
Does the strategic motive in using forward markets enhance competition? General 
consensus points towards this direction, and the little experimental (Le-Coq and Orzen 
(2006) and Brandts et al. (2008)) and empirical2 literature (Wolak, 2000) agrees with 
this assertion. Theory, however, is not clear on the issue. Alaz (1992) and Alaz and Vila 
(1993) suggest pro-competitive outcomes while Ferreira (2003), Mahenc and Salanie3 
(2004) and Liski and Montero (2005) suggest anticompetitive outcomes4. 
The experimental evidence points towards the fact that forward markets are 
competitive (Le-Coq and Orzen, 2006 and Brandts et al., 2008). Le Coq and Orzen 
motivate their study based on Allaz and Vila (1993). In their experiments they have a 
single forward and a spot market phase. Subjects offer to sell in the forward period 
realizing profits for the quantity sold in that period. They then play on the residual 
demand in the subsequent spot period. They show that, relative to the spot market, the 
introduction of forward markets does have competition enhancing effects. However, 
forward markets are not as competitive as theory predicts when there are two firms, but 
are not significantly different than the theory prediction for four players. They also 
show that increasing the number of firms from 2 to 4 makes the market more 
competitive than introducing forward markets. 
In the second experimental study, Brandts et al. motivate their study based on a 
specific design of forward markets that occur in the electric power industry. They 
consider both quantity and supply functions as strategic variables. In a model following 
Alaz and Vila, they find that, indeed, subjects show a pro-competitive effect, and that 
they sell more if the model has a forward market compared with the situation in which 
this market is not available. Studying the effects of forward markets when 2, or 3, firms 
can submit quantities, or supply functions, they find that the introduction of forward 
markets has competition enhancing effects. Moreover, supply functions have efficiency 
enhancing effects in the presence of forward markets. 
                                                 
2 Empirical evidence has been scarce and the matter gets further complicated given the fact in some 
markets firms are required to participate in forward markets. 
3 With price competition and differentiated goods. 
4 Other papers have explored aspects of the competition that may affect the strategic behavior of the 
forward markets. For example, Hughes and Kao (1997) and Ferreira (2006) study the observability of 
actions, Murphy and Smeers (2005) study capacity choice, Gans, Price and Woods (1998) and Newbery 
(1998) study entry, while Bushnell et al.(2008) study regulatory arrangements to promote forward 
contracting. 
 
The empirical research on forward markets is scarce. For the Australian power 
market, Wolak (2000) shows that, indeed, when firms use the forward market, the effect 
is pro-competitive. In general, the use of forward markets is spreading. The problem is 
that in many instances there is strong regulation that gives firms big incentives to 
participate in them. Most models described above agree that, when used, forward 
markets are pro-competitive. However, there is still the question whether firms will 
avoid competition by not using them when deciding in a non-regulated market. 
In this paper we experimentally test the strategic motive to sell forward in 
experimental oligopolies. Our paper is closer to Le-Coq and Orzen (2006) in that we 
directly test the strategic motive to sell in forward markets5. We ran our experiments 
with two and four firms with in-experienced and experienced6 subjects. The forward 
markets were run with the exogenous and endogenous close rules. The exogenous-close 
rule directly tests the model of Allaz and Vila (1993) in which the number of forward 
periods is (exogenously) fixed by the experimenter7. For the purpose of our experiments 
we had two forward periods prior to the spot market. The endogenous close version was 
designed keeping in mind the infinitely repeated forward periods prior to the spot 
market (Allaz and Vila, 1993 and Ferreira, 2003). In the implementation of this version 
the number of periods in the forward market was not pre-determined. Firms had the 
opportunity to sell in a sequence of forward markets with the only restriction being that 
the forward markets were discontinued as soon as they were not used by any firm in the 
current forward period. When this occured the game went directly to the spot market8. 
We show that, in the exogenous close experiments, with once experienced 
subjects, outcomes are far from the competitive theoretical prediction. Experimental 
duopolies result in near monopoly outcomes, while quadropolies are closer to the Nash-
Cournot prediction. Further, experienced subjects use forward markets much less 
compared to inexperienced subjects. However, as in Le-Coq and Orzen (2006), with 
inexperienced subjects adding forward markets has a competition enhancing effect. 
Further, the pro-competitive outcome is obtained when one increases the number of 
                                                 
5 Note that Brandts et al. test the role of forward markets in a design specifically motivated by the electric 
industry. 
6 Ours is the first experimental study to look at the effect of experience in Cournot experimental 
oligopolies. 
7 Le-Coq and Orzen (2006) study the exogenous close rule with just one forward market. 
8 This setting is inspired by Ferreira (2003), although it does not directly share the same theoretical 
characteristics. 
firms from two to four. The “numbers” result in Le-Coq and Orzen is maintained even 
with experienced subjects. 
The results under the endogenous close rule are much more competitive than 
under exogenous close both with inexperienced and experienced subjects. Inexperienced 
subjects produce output nearly at the competitive level while experienced subjects learn 
to avoid competition in the duopoly case, but not under a quadropoly. The prisoners’ 
dilemma nature of the strategic motive to sell forward, that results in competitive 
outcomes, survives under the endogenous-close design. Subjects, especially 
quadropolies, find it harder to coordinate actions and outcomes are competitive. 
We also find that the role of experience is important especially in a complicated 
environment such as forward markets, where the results strongly rely on the strategic 
motive to sell forward. Under exogenous close experienced subjects use forward 
markets much less than their inexperienced counterparts. Duopolies operating in 
forward markets find it much easier to collude without explicit communication. The 
outcome with four firms is also much less competitive than has been observed for 
(inexperienced) experimental duopolies (see, Huck et al., 2004). The effect of 
experience under the endogenous close rule is, however, of a smaller magnitude than 
what is observed under the exogenous close. Experience develops a better 
understanding of the market functioning and is a precondition (rationality) in most 
theoretical models. Our results support this assertion and point towards the importance 
of running forward market experiments with experienced subjects. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical 
motivation behind the experiments. In Section 3 we present the experimental design. 
This is followed by the results for the exogenous and endogenous models in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theory 
In this part we outline the theoretical models that motivate our experimental design. We 
focus on Allaz (1992), Allaz and Vila (1993) and Ferreira (2003). In a Cournot duopoly, 
Allaz (1992) shows that, if firms can sell in a forward market previous to the spot 
market, the strategic interactions result in a more competitive outcome. In a later paper, 
Allaz and Vila (1993) show that this pro-competitive effect increases as the forward 
markets open more often. However, later papers cast some doubts on the robustness of 
this pro-competitive effect. 
Ferreira (2003), on the other hand, shows that if the forward market has 
infinitely many moments in which trade is allowed, any price between Cournot and 
perfect competition can be sustained in equilibrium. Further, the Cournot outcome is the 
only Renegotiation-proof equilibrium. If firms are allowed to buy in the forward 
market, then the range of equilibrium prices that can be sustained in equilibrium reaches 
the monopoly price. Below, we outline two versions of forward markets. In the first 
version (Allaz and Vila, 1993) the number of forward markets is exogenously 
determined. In the second version the forward markets can open many times, with an 
endogenously given stopping rule. 
 
2.1 Allaz and Vila (1993) 
Suppose there are n firms in an oligopolistic market that compete in quantity and face a 
linear demand  with zero costs. If, previous to this spot market, firms can sell 
forward, standard Cournot analysis shows that, in equilibrium, Firm i will sell 
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We assume a no-arbitrage condition in solving this problem. This implies that 
that forward and spot prices are equal. For example, Allaz (1992) shows that the 
introduction of arbitrageurs, that buy in the forward markets to sell in the spot, implies 
that there is no arbitrage in equilibrium. Substituting the arbitrageurs with the no-
arbitrage condition simplifies the model. The solution of the problem for each firm 
gives the solution 
)(
1
1 1
2
2 FA
n
nfi −+
−= , and )(
1
1 1
2 FAn
ps si −+== , 
where, . ∑
=
=
n
j
jfF
1
11
Now, in period 1 of the forward market, Firm i solves 
siii
f
psff
i
)( 21max
1
++ , 
where )(
1
1 1
2
2 FA
n
nfi −+
−= , and )(
1
1 1
2 FAn
ps si −+== . 
The solution of this problem for all firms gives 
1
)1(
23
2
1
++−
−=
nnn
Anfi . 
The rest of the variables are found substituting this value in their corresponding 
expressions. When firms face identical, constant marginal costs c,  replaces A in 
all of the above expressions, and the price will be given by the expression, 
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2.2 Extensions of Allaz and Vila (1993) 
Allaz and Vila examine a model with finitely many periods of forward markets 
and find that, as the total number of periods increases, the total sold quantity also does. 
Further, as the number of periods of forward markets goes to infinite, the limit of the 
quantity is the competitive outcome. For the particular case of two firms, the case of T 
periods in which the forward market is open, gives 
T
Afsp tii 23 +=== , and T
ATq
23
)1(2 +
+= . 
It can easily be checked that, as T increases, the price p goes to zero, and total quantity q 
converges to A, the competitive outcome. 
However, something similar to a Folk Theorem is obtained if the infinite case is 
analyzed directly, in which all total quantities (and their corresponding market prices) 
between competitive and Cournot can be observed in equilibrium. This result is shown 
in Ferreira (2003). The Cournot result can be supported in equilibrium by the following 
strategy. Firms sell nothing in the forward markets and play standard Cournot in the 
spot market. If a firm deviates and sells forward at some point, the other firms also sell 
in the next period. When one firm sells forward, it makes some extra profits with 
respect to the equilibrium behavior. However, when the other firms also sell in the next 
period to punish the deviation, its profits are reduced. The punishment phase is 
calibrated so the deviator makes a net loss. Ferreira shows that similar strategies can 
actually support any outcome between the competitive and the Cournot quantities. 
However, the Cournot outcome is the only one that satisfies some equilibrium 
refinements like renegotiation-proofness or Pareto perfection. 
Notice that after firms sell in the forward market each of the subgames is a 
reduced version of the original game (with a smaller residual demand, depending on 
how much was sold in the previous markets). This makes the model different from a 
repeated game, because, in the repeated game, the demand remains the same in each 
period. There is, however, a similar result once it is established that there is still room 
for credible punishments in spite of the smaller demand and of the smaller impact of the 
punishment. 
 
3. Experimental design 
Below we discuss the general experimental design for the exogenous and 
endogenous close model. After this we discuss experimental details about the design of 
the endogenous close experiments. 
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student populations at George 
Mason and Chapman Universities. They were told that the experiments will last around 
two hours9. Subjects were asked to commit to a series of two experiments and were told 
that a $20 fees will be paid to those that show-up for both experiments10. We report 
results for both inexperienced and experienced subjects. Table 1 summarizes 
experimental details. 
Including the instructions the experiments finished in two hours. The instructions setup 
was the same for the exogenous and endogenous close markets. At the end of the 
instructions inexperienced subjects were required to play practice rounds against a 
computer before actually engaging in the game. For experienced players we added a 
tutorial where they were walked through several examples inputting specific values for 
                                                 
9 The number of experiments ran depended on subject show-up. 
10 For the experiments at GMU all subjects were not necessarily part of the same group for the second 
time. 
output. The objective was to familiarize them with different output choices they, and 
others, may make during the experiment. It should be pointed out that the tutorial goes 
over similar kinds of examples that were used in the instructions for both inexperienced 
and experienced subjects. The texts of instructions and tutorial can be found in the 
Appendix. Table 2 summarizes the experimental parameters. 
 
Table 1: Experiments 
Exogenous Stop Endogenous Stop 
 
 
 George Mason Chapman George Mason Chapman 
Inexperienced     
Duopoly 3 6 4 6 
Quadropoly 4 - 5 - 
Experienced     
Duopoly 4 6 5 6 
Quadropoly 4 - 3 - 
 
Table 2: Experimental parameters 
 Demand Marginal Cost Forward Markets 
In-experienced Q=105-P 15 2 
Experienced Q=60-P 0 2 
 
To deal with the no-arbitrage condition, in each of the forward markets periods, 
the forward market price is computed as the theoretical price that would prevail in the 
remaining periods if the theoretical model is solved with the residual demand. For 
example, in the duopoly case, let the total of sales in the first period of forward markets 
be 20. The program then computes a forward market price for that period as the 
equilibrium price (as in Allaz and Vila) with one period of forward markets and demand 
given by . qAp −−= 20
Subjects are explained this process of price determination in the instructions, and 
given specific examples. They are provided with a calculator showing two output 
choices, “mine” and “others”, and subsequent own profits. By resetting own and others’ 
output they can estimate how their profits vary as either one of the two output changes. 
Furthermore, as an exercise in the instructions they are asked to input specific own and 
other outputs to view its subsequent effect on own profits. We felt that providing this 
guidance would facilitate the understanding of best response in the strict sense. 
Le Coq and Orzen (2006) were the first to test Allaz and Villa’s model in the 
laboratory. Our exogenous close experimental design, however, has several features that 
are different from theirs. 
First, subjects are randomly matched in each round of our experiments. Subjects 
in our experiments can be matched against the same partner with a positive probability, 
however, given that they do not observe rival identity this makes collusion and other 
group behavior very difficult. Given that random matching oligopoly experiments give 
more competitive outcomes (Huck et al, 2004) we chose this design to give the theory 
its best shot. Further, note that although theoretically the finite repetition of the game 
with only one equilibrium cannot generate cooperation, there is experimental evidence 
that subjects may still cooperate for some rounds if the game is long enough (Dal Bó, 
2005). 
Second, we run our exogenous close experiments for nearly seventy rounds (Le-
Coq and Orzen had 30 periods). We do this to facilitate subject learning as forward 
markets are complicated mechanisms. 
Third, we use two periods of forward markets. According to the model in Alaz 
and Vila, two periods of forward markets make the market much more competitive than 
just one period, especially for the quadropoly case. This, together with the random 
matching, made a very pro-competitive experimental setting. 
Fourth, we replicate the experiment with experienced subjects. Experiments on 
competitive markets show that are they are robust to design changes. Experimental 
behavior in these markets is as theory predicts11. Forward markets, however, are more 
complicated12. Due to the scant experimental work on forward markets we run our 
experiments with experienced subjects as a robustness check. Further, typically real life 
agents in these markets are going to be big firms, or professional traders, that should 
have a good working knowledge of the functioning of these markets. Thus, it seems 
natural to check whether the experimental results are robust to experience. 
 
Endogenous close experiments 
One has the obvious problem of time limitation in conducting experiments with 
infinitely many periods. In standard repeated games the discount factor can be 
substituted with a probability of ending the game, thus avoiding the problem. 
Something similar could be done with the repetition of forward markets even if the 
model requires no discount factor. However there is still a bigger problem. In our 
                                                 
11 The Double-Auction institution is one example. 
12 In complicated environments it is common practice to report results for experienced subjects. For 
example, see Rassenti et al. 1994. 
structure the residual demand decreases as firms sell positive amounts in forward 
market. This leads to many possible subgames where the residual demand is very small. 
The analysis in Ferreira (1993) holds for all these subgames (that may never be reached 
in equilibrium, but are necessary to sustain cooperation). Further, there is the problem 
of requiring rationality even when the prospects at stake are very small. That is, if for 
very small residual demands subjects may not care for very small differences in profits. 
Then for some subgames, the behavior in the residual demand may not work as the 
theory predicts. 
To complicate matters, there is still the problem that, in any practical situation, 
we cannot work with numbers smaller than any given unit of measure (in our 
experiment, this unit was the experimental dollar). This means that, after a finite number 
of periods selling in the forward market, all subgames are the same and trivial (i.e., with 
zero demand). This means that, in practice, there will be no room for punishments after 
some (very marginally) profitable deviations. Thus, given the integer problem, the 
infinite number of periods of forward markets will have only finitely relevant periods. 
Subsequently, the model will work like Allaz and Vila for many periods of forward 
markets. 
The literature on finitely repeated games shows that, theoretically, small 
departures from rationality is enough to achieve cooperation (e.g., ε -Nash equilibrium, 
non-common knowledge of rationality, absent-mindedness13). As we mentioned before, 
the experimental literature shows that, in fact subjects cooperate in finitely repeated 
games. 
There are additional practical problems if we decide to implement a random 
ending to the periods of forward trade. First, if subjects decided not to use the forward 
markets, they must rest idle as the computer generates more periods of forward markets. 
Second, subjects will not feel sure that there will always be a chance to punish deviators 
who sell in the forward markets. 
Due to all these problems we decided to experiment with a somewhat different 
implementation of the infinite forward market game. The forward markets would 
continue to open sequentially as long as firms continued to make use of them, but as 
soon as a forward period occurred when no firm sold any quantity, then there would be 
no further forward markets and the game would go directly to the spot market. 
                                                 
13 See Radner (1980), Fudenberg and Levine (1983) or Dilger (2006). 
Theoretically, this game gives us the same equilibria as the model in Ferreira, and does 
not need an exogenous random ending. In practice, due to the integer problem, the 
design is closer to Allaz and Vila with finitely many repetitions. 
 
4. Experimental results 
4.1 A brief look 
Exogenous Close 
Before we look at detailed results it will be useful to look at some summary statistics. 
We first look at the exogenous close model of Allaz and Vila. Table 3 compares the 
theoretical values and the average of the values in the experiments for both the 2 and 4-
firm cases, and for both inexperienced and experienced subjects. For simplicity of 
exposition all quantities are expressed relative to the competitive amount (set to 100%). 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics-Exogenous Close 
 Compe- titive Cournot Monop.
Allaz and Vila 
(theory pred.) 
In-
Experienced Experienced
2 
firms 100 66.66 50 85.71 85.56 62.53 
4 
firms 100 80 50 98.11 99.85 76.84 
 
Two results stand out in Table 3. First, inexperienced subjects tend to behave 
competitively in accordance with theory. While the average output observed for 
duopoly is near the prediction of the AV model, a quadropoly gives near competitive 
outcomes. Second, experienced subjects are less competitive. This is especially true for 
duopolies where average output is not only far below the prediction of the AV model, 
but also below the 2-firms Cournot quantity. Further, a quadropoly is also less 
competitive and its output is also below the 4-firms Cournot level, and far below the 
prediction of the AV model. 
Our findings for inexperienced subjects agree with Le-Coq and Orzen. However, 
we find strikingly different behavior for experienced subjects. They not only behave 
less competitively, but manage to restrict production below the Cournot-Nash prediction 
both for duopolies and quadropolies. 
 
 
Endogenous close 
Table 4 compares the theoretical and the average values both for inexperienced and 
experienced subjects. As before, in order to make comparisons easier, we normalize all 
quantities as percentages of the competitive quantity. 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics-Endogenous Close 
 Competition and Allaz and Vila 
Cournot 
(Ferreira) Monopoly
Inexp. 
subjects 
Experienced 
subjects 
2 firms 100 66.66 50 98.32 79.12 
4 firms 100, (>100) 80 50 103.23 (130) 
 
As with exogenous close, inexperienced subjects behave competitively. 
Experienced subjects, however, behave less competitively only for duopolies, although, 
the outcome is more competitive than the theoretical Cournot-Nash prediction. The 
higher than competitive quantity in the 4-firm oligopoly can be explained due to zero 
marginal costs used in that experiment: any quantities that add up to 100 or more, 
resulting in zero profits, are equivalent. One should, however, note that a competitive 
quantity produced across all the forward and spot periods does not (always) imply zero 
profits as profits are realized in each period. 
 
4.2 A closer look at the data 
Below we present results for the exogenous and endogenous close models. Results for 
inexperienced subjects will be discussed first followed by results for experienced 
subjects. 
 
4.2.1 Duopoly: Exogenous close 
Looking at summary data we know that inexperienced subjects behave according to 
theory, and experienced subjects behave less competitively. Analyzing how individuals 
make use of the forward and spot markets, we see that inexperienced subjects chose 
output in consonance with theory (although the quantities chosen in forward markets are 
significantly different from the theoretical prediction). Interestingly, even though 
experienced subjects make use of forward markets in the earlier periods, later on they 
learn not to make use of them. 
Table 5 compares theoretical predictions for the forward and spot markets, the 
observed quantities in these markets and the theoretical quantity given the production in 
the previous period for inexperienced subjects. The theoretical prediction lists the sub-
game perfect equilibrium quantities in each stage. The theoretical predictions for the 
residual demand are computed as the sub-game perfect equilibrium quantities in the 
sub-game. Thus, given the average of 35.68 units in first forward stage, the rest of the 
game is that of a one-period forward market (Alaz and Vila) with a demand given by 
. The theoretical prediction in this sub-game is 25.73 units in the 
second period of forward markets. Given the residual demand and the average 
production in the two forward markets, the theoretical prediction in the spot market is 
the Cournot equilibrium in the duopoly game with demand 
qp )68.35100( −=
qp )3.2268.35100( −−=  
(see Table 5). Note that it is better to compare subject behavior with the theoretical 
quantities in the residual demand (given observed quantities) rather than with the 
theoretical quantities as computed from the beginning. 
 
Table 5- Inexperienced duopoly: 
Use of forward and spot markets. Exogenous close. 
 Forward 1 Forward 2 Spot Total 
Theoretical quantity 28.57 28.57 28.57 85.71 
Observed quantity 35.68 22.3 27.58 85.56 
Theoretical q. in the residual demand 
(given observed quantity) 28.57 25.73 28 - 
p-value (obs. = theory) 
(t-test) 
0 
(8.05) 
0 
(11.0) 
0.07 
(1.47) 
0.38 
(0.29)
p-value (obs. = theory in resid. demand) 
(t-test) 
0 
(8.05) 
0 
(6.0) 
0.268 
(0.617) - 
 
As a reference it is useful to see what would happen if firms behaved as a 
monopolist or competitively. If firms behave as a monopolist in the residual demand of 
the spot market, the market quantity would have been (½)(100-35.68-22.3) = 21.01. 
However, if firms behaved competitively in the residual demand of the spot market, 
market quantity would have been 42.02, as compared with the observed 27.58. We 
cannot reject the hypothesis that spot and total quantities are the ones dictated by the 
theory. The fit is even better if we make the comparison with the theoretical outcomes 
given the observed quantities. 
In the case of experienced subjects, subjects tacitly collude by not using the 
forward markets. In the spot market they sell more than the theory prediction given the 
theoretical values in the forward markets, but less that the theory prediction (Cournot) 
given the observed use of forward markets. This is shown in Table 6. All quantities are 
statistically different from theory prediction (or from other quantities like Cournot, 
Monopoly or Perfect Competition.) 
 
Table 6 - Experienced duopoly: Exogenous close 
Use of forward and spot markets. 
 Forward 1 Forward 2 Spot Total 
Theoretical quantity 28.57 28.57 28.57 85.71
Observed quantity 0.94 4.74 56.85 62.53
Theoretical q. in the residual demand  
(given observed quantity) 28.57 39.62 62.88 - 
 
Again, as a reference, the Monopoly and competitive quantities in RD in the spot 
markets are (½)(100-0.94-4.74) = 47.16, and 94.32 respectively. Recall that Cournot 
behavior without forward markets is 66.66. As the observed values are very far from the 
theoretical ones we do not bother with the statistical tests. 
Figures 1 and 2 below shed light on choices made by inexperienced and 
experienced subjects. Quantities shown are the average individual quantities for each 
round. 
We observe a decreasing trend in the quantities as rounds advance in both 
figures. To capture this tendency in Tables 7 and 8 we present an analysis of the data for 
the first and last ten rounds. For inexperienced subjects, the significant change between 
the first and the last 10 rounds is due to a shift from the forward to the spot market. That 
is, in later rounds subjects tend to sell less in the forward market and more in the spot, 
thus resulting in smaller sales. 
We can have a clearer view of how subjects restrain output in a particular market 
if we analyze sales with respect to the equilibrium in the residual demand. In Table 7, 
what looks like a moderate 8.2% decrease (Observed-1 vs Observed-2) of sales in 
Forward-2 (the second period of forward markets), now is seen as a 21.2% decrease. 
This is due to the fact that, after observing the quantity in Forward-1, more should have 
been sold in Forward-2 in the last ten rounds. Conversely, what looks like a strong 
increase in the spot market (a 52%) is, in fact, a moderate one (9.1%) if, instead 
Figure 1: Use of forward and spot. Inexperienced duopoly 
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Figure 2: Use of forward and spot. Experienced duopoly 
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of comparing absolute quantities, we compare the percentage of the equilibrium 
quantities that these quantities represent. Note that all changes are statistically 
significant except for the change in the spot market measured as a percentage of the 
theoretical quantity in the residual demand (RD). 
 
Table 7- Inexperienced duopoly: Exogenous close 
Use of forward and spot-First and Last ten rounds 
 Forward-1 Forward-2 Spot Total 
Theory 28.57 28.57 28.57 85.71
Observed-1 
(as proportion of theory in RD) 
44.54 
(156) 
22.86 
(113) 
20.26 
(93) 
87.64
- First 
10 Theoretical quantity in RD (given 
observed quantity) 28.57 22.18 21.73 - 
Observed-2 
(as proportion of theory in RD) 
31.72 
(111) 
20.98 
(89) 
30.80 
(101.82) 
83.5 
- Last 
10 Theoretical quantity 
(given observed quantity): RD 28.57 27.31 31.53 - 
% Change of observation 
(p-value) 
-28.8 
(0) 
-8.2 
(0) 
52 
(0) 
-4.7 
(0) 
% Change of observation when measured 
as a proportion of theory in RD 
(p-value) 
-28.8 
(0) 
-21.2 
(0.001) 
9.1 
(0.09) - 
 
The story is quite different when one looks at experienced subjects (Table 8). An 
important result is that one observes a striking decrease in the use of forward markets. 
There is no sizeable increase in the quantity sold in the spot market in absolute terms, 
but there is a decrease with respect to the equilibrium quantity in the residual demand 
(RD). The reduction is much bigger in the forward market stage. It seems that subjects 
learn to reduce sales in the forward market before they learn to restrain sales in the spot 
market. 
 
Table 8- Experienced duopoly: Exogenous close 
Use of forward and spot-First and Last ten rounds 
2 Exog. Exp. Forward 1 Forward 2 Spot Total 
Theory 28.57 28.57 28.57 85.71
Observed-1 
(as proportion of theory in RD) 
2.66 
(9.3) 
8.36 
(22) 
55.24 
(97) 
66.26
- First 
10 Theoretical quantity (given 
observed quantity): RD 28.57 38.93 59.32 - 
Observed-2 
(as proportion of theory in RD) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
3.72 
(9.3) 
55.62 
(86.9) 
59.42
- Last 
10 Theoretical quantity (given 
observed quantity): RD 28.57 39.97 64.13 - 
% Change of observation 
(p-value) 
-97 
(0) 
-55.58 
(0) 
0.69 
(0.35) 
10.34
(0) 
% Change of observation when measured 
as a proportion of theory in RD 
(p-value) 
-97 
(0) 
-57.8 
(0.001) 
-10.4 
(0.0008) - 
 
4.2.2 Quadropoly: Exogenous close 
Under a quadropoly, inexperienced subjects behave remarkably close to the theoretical 
prediction in both the forward and spot markets. The exact theoretical prediction is, 
however, rejected. When one contrasts the outcomes with respect to the theoretical 
prediction in the residual demand, then the behavior in the second period of forward 
markets (Forward 2) is as predicted by theory. Both spot and total quantities are not 
significantly different from competitive behavior. Our results are along the lines of Le-
Coq and Orzen where four or more agents behave more competitively than predicted by 
theory. Table 9 below shows this. 
 
Table 9- Inexperienced quadropoly: Exogenous close 
Use of forward and spot 
 Forward 1 
Forward 
2 Spot Total 
Theoretical q 67.92 22.64 7.55 98.11 
Observed q 72.23 19.24 8.38 99.85 
Theoretical q. in the residual demand (given 
observed quantity) 67.92 19.6 6.82 - 
Perfect competition in RD - - 8.53 100 
p-value (Obs.= Theory) 
(T-test) 
0.00029 
(3.45) 
0 
(5.65) 
0.015 
(2.18) 
0 
(6.26)
p-value (Obs. = Theory in RD) 
(t-test) 
0.00029 
(3.45) 
0.27 
(0.6) 
0 
(4.1) - 
p-value (Obs. = perfect competition) 
(t-test) - - 
0.34 
(0.39) 
0.3 
(0.53)
 
Table 10 shows the use of forward and spot market for experienced subjects. As 
in the duopoly case, experienced subjects make little use of forward markets. The spot 
market production is, again, higher than the theoretical prediction given the theoretical 
quantities in the forward markets, but less than the theoretical prediction given the 
actual use of forward markets. The overall total quantity is smaller than the predicted 
total.  
 
Table 10- Experienced quadropoly: Exogenous close 
Use of forward and spot 
 Forward 1 Forward 2 Spot Total 
Theoretical q 67.92 22.64 7.55 98.11 
Theoretical q in the RD 67.92 68.22 69.84 - 
Observed q 3.36 9.36 64.1 76.82 
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Again, as a reference, Monopoly in the residual demand is (½)(100-3.36-9.36) = 
43.65, and the competitive quantity is 87.3. Also, recall that the Cournot quantity 
without forward markets is 80. We do not show statistical tests as quantities are far from 
any reference values. 
Figures 3 and 4 show us the choices made by inexperienced and experienced 
subjects for quadropolies. Quantities shown are the average individual quantities for 
each round. 
For inexperienced subjects, the change in the spot market is not statistically 
significant (see Table 11). There is an increase in the use of Forward-1 but a decrease in 
the use of Forward-2. Spot quantity is slightly above the theoretical prediction in 
absolute terms and a little lower in relative terms. Regardless, neither of these changes 
is statistically significant. The changes in the forward and spot markets, however, 
compensate each other so that there is no effect in the total quantity. 
It may look paradoxical that observations are greater on average than the 
average theoretical prediction and that, at the same time, they are lower as a proportion 
of the theoretical prediction. The reason is that lower quantities also represent a lower 
proportion. For example, suppose that we have 3 observations in the spot market of 8, 2 
and 18 after forward quantities of 90, 95 and 80, respectively, have been observed. The 
theory prediction in this case is 4/5 of “100 minus the forward quantities”, which gives 
us 8, 4 and 16, respectively. The observations are 100, 50 and 112% of these quantities. 
Averages are: 88.33 for observed forward quantities, 9.31 for the average spot 
theoretical prediction, 10 for the observed spot quantity and 87.5 for the observed spot 
quantity as a proportion of the theoretical prediction. 
For experienced subjects we again observe a significant decrease in the use of 
the first period (Table 12). The smaller decrease in the use of the second period is not 
statistically significant. The reduction in the spot quantity is significant when measured 
as a proportion of the theoretical quantity in the residual demand. We observe that 
experienced subjects avoid the use of forward markets and produce less than Cournot in 
the spot market. This is the same pattern observed in the duopoly case, although the 
total quantities are always higher in the case of the quadropoly. 
Table 11: Inexperienced duopoly: Exogenous close 
Use of forward and spot-First and Last ten rounds 
 Forward 1 Forward 2 Spot Total 
Theory 67.92 22.64 7.55 98.11 
Observation 
(average as proportion RD) 
64.78 
(95.4) 
25.11 
(90.27) 
9.5 
(83.94) 
99.39
- First 10 Theory in RD 
(average) 67.92 24.86 8.09 - 
Observation 
(average as proportion RD) 
77.42 
(114) 
11.03 
(58.8) 
10.64 
(86.31) 
99.09
- Last 10 Theory in RD 
(average) 67.92 15.94 9.24 - 
% Change of observation 
(p-value) 
19.7 
(0.001) 
-56 
(0) 
12 
(0.25) 
-0.3 
(0.47)
% Change of observation when measured 
as a proportion of theory in RD 
(p-value) 
19.7 
(0.001) 
-34.8 
(0) 
-2.8 
(0.48) - 
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Table 12: Experienced duopoly: Exogenous close 
Use of forward and spot-First and Last ten rounds 
 Forward 1 Forward 2 Spot Total 
Theory 67.92 22.64 7.55 98.11 
Observation 
(average as proportion RD)
6.46 
(9.5) 
7.75 
(12.7) 
64.21 
(101.9) 
78.42
- First 10 Theory in RD 
(average) 67.92 66.03 68.63 - 
Observation 
(average as proportion RD)
1.79 
(2.6) 
7.54 
(12.7) 
66.21 
(88.1) 
75.54
- Last 10 Theory in RD 
(average) 67.92 69.32 72.53 - 
% Change of observation 
(p-value) 
-72.3 
(0.001) 
-2.7 
(0.47) 
3.1 
(0.25) 
-3.7 
(0.24)
% Change of obs. when measured as a 
proportion of theory in RD 
(p-value) 
-72.3 -0.5 (0.49) 
-13.4 
(0.029) - 
 
4.2.3 Endogenous close 
Recall that in the endogenous close case the market moves over to the spot phase when 
no seller offers to sell anything in a forward market. To achieve this requires a certain 
amount of coordination, or tacit behavior, on the part of the subjects. We find that 
subjects found it hard to achieve this under the endogenous close rule. The endogenous 
close rule captures the prisoners’ dilemma nature of the strategic motive to sell forward 
as subjects observe rival choices (individual for duopoly and aggregate for quadropoly) 
in the next forward period. It could be for this reason that subjects had problems 
coordinating their actions so as to move production to the spot market. One would 
expect that the coordination would be much easier for a duopoly than for a quadropoly. 
Looking at data one sees that this is true but, mainly when subjects are experienced. 
Both for duopoly and quadropoly there are sessions where inexperienced subjects 
manage to move to the spot market only after 26 periods of forward markets. It is for 
this reason that a two-hour experiment could only run for less than half as many rounds 
under endogenous close as under exogenous close. Though, the number of rounds 
executed by experienced subjects was not much greater, very long drawn out forward 
markets were not as frequent for them. 
 Relative to exogenous close, under endogenous close almost all trade takes place 
in the forward markets with both inexperienced and experienced subjects (Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Endogenous Close-Inexperienced. 
Output Choice-Forward vs. Spot 
 Observed Forward 
Observed
Spot Cournot in RD Monopoly in RD 
Duo. in-exp. 98.7 0.1 0.87 0.65 
Duo. exp. 75.54 5.9 16.31 12.23 
Quad. in-exp. 103.22 0.12 0 0 
Quad. exp. 129.08 1.08 0 0 
 
 One can see that there is no substantial difference between inexperienced and 
experienced subjects for a quadropoly. All market structures behave competitively. In 
the case of inexperienced subjects, the average quantity produced in the forward stage is 
103.22 and is almost the same as the competitive 100. The p-value obtained from the t-
test is 0.032. A similar outcome is seen for experienced subjects. In both the cases, no 
residual demand is left after the use of the forward markets. As a result there is nothing 
interesting to be seen in the spot market. 
 Unlike the exogenous stopping rule (and what has been observed in other 
oligopoly experiments), inexperienced duopolists behave very competitively. The 
average quantity in this case, however, is statistically different from the competitive 
outcome. Once more, almost everything is sold in the forward markets. Again, as the 
residual demand is very small in the spot market it is hard to give any meaning to 
subject behavior there. 
 The only case where we observe outcomes that are not competitive is for 
experienced duopoly (see Table 14). Compared with inexperienced subjects, there is a 
reduction in the use of forward markets. Also, output choice in the spot market is almost 
a third of the theoretical Cournot prediction for the residual demand, and almost half the 
Monopoly quantity. The total quantity produced is between competitive and the 
standard Cournot. Regardless, outcomes tend towards competitive even for a duopoly. 
Behavior for inexperienced subjects does not change much as the rounds unfold. 
The average quantity chosen in the forward markets is 98.45 and 98.7 for the first and 
last ten rounds, respectively. The spot quantities are 0.14 and 0.06. Note that none of the 
differences is significant (with p-values of 0.46 and 0.13, respectively). 
 In Table 15 we analyze the endogenous close case for experienced duopoly. 
Showing a similar pattern as for exogenous close, subjects learn to avoid the use of 
forward markets, although, now they start and end at a much higher level of output. 
Further, production is greater in the spot market, not only in absolute terms, but also as 
a proportion of the equilibrium (Cournot) for the residual demand. Both of these 
changes are statistically significant. The total effect is, however, only slightly decreased 
(an insignificant change overall). 
  
Table 14: Endogenous Close-Inexperienced. 
Output Choice-Forward vs. Spot (Duopoly) 
 Forward Spot Total 
Perfect comp. (AV) 100 0 100 
Cournot (Ferrerira) 0 66.67 66.67 
Cournot in RD - 16.3 - 
Monopoly in RD - 12.23 - 
Observed q 75.54 5.9 81.45 
Observed q as % of Cournot in RD - 36.2 - 
 
 Figures 5 and 6, below, show the evolution of subject behavior for the 
endogenous close rule. 
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 Overall, the pattern has similarities with the exogenous close inexperienced case. 
There we observe a decrease in the use of forward markets, and an increase in the use of 
spot markets with the final effect of a decrease in total quantity. It seems that, under 
endogenous close, it takes more time and learning to avoid the use of forward markets. 
This hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that, in the final rounds, we observed some 
markets with zero positions in the forward markets. Further, in the Chapman 
experiments, we were able to run the experiments for experienced duopoly for more 
rounds than we did at George Mason. The numbers in Tables 14 and 15 (and Figure 6) 
correspond to the aggregation of the 30 rounds at George Mason and the first 30 at 
Chapman. Figure 7 shows the counterpart of Figure 6, but now showing only the data 
from the 40 last rounds at Chapman. We can observe how the behavior in the last 
rounds has a clear tendency towards avoiding the use of forward markets. Note that the 
quadropoly experiments show a pattern similar to Figure 5 (see Appendix). 
 
Table 15: Experienced duopoly: Endogenous close 
Use of forward and spot-First and Last ten rounds 
 Forward Spot Total 
Perfect comp. (AV) 100 0 100 
Cournot (Ferreira) 0 66.67 66.67 
Cournot in RD - 12.31 - 
Monopoly in RD - 9.23 - First 10 Observed-1 
(as % of Cournot in RD) 
81.53 
- 
2.34 
(19) 
83.87 
- 
Cournot in RD - 23.67 - 
Monopoly in RD - 17.75 - Last 10 Observed-2 
(as % of Cournot in RD) 
64.5 
- 
14.62 
(61.2) 
79.12 
- 
% Change of observed 
(p-value) 
-20.8 
(0.0013)
522 
(0) 
-5.6 
(0.15) 
% Change of observed quantity when measured as
a proportion of theory in RD 
(p-value) 
- 223 (0) - 
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4.3 Cournot Oligopoly vs. Forward markets 
In another paper (Ferreira et al., 2009) we study experimental Cournot oligopolies14. 
Below we compare some results from this paper with the exogenous and endogenous 
close forward markets experiments. By doing so, we compare the effect of introducing 
more firms in the market, i.e., 2 vs. 4, and the addition of forward markets. Table 16 
                                                 
14 We report results from a companion paper on Cournot oligopolies (Ferreira, Kujal, Rassenti, 2009, 
mimeo). 
summarizes average sales by duopolies and quadropolies (with no forward markets) 
against the exogenous close and the endogenous close forward markets. 
Looking at Table 16 one sees that due to experience the average output for a 
quadropoly decreases from 84.58 to 81.58, a decrease of 3.55%. This decrease is of a 
much greater magnitude for a duopoly, with an experienced duopoly producing output 
closer to the monopoly level (53) resulting in a decrease of 32.86%. Comparing these 
results one sees that experienced quadropolies in forward markets with exogenous close 
are less competitive than Cournot quadropolies. Note that for an exogenous close 
quadropoly, which starts from a higher benchmark (99.85), the output decrease is of a 
greater magnitude (23.04%) than what is observed for the Cournot case. Note, however, 
that a Cournot duopoly with experienced subjects is less competitive than a duopoly in 
the presence of forward markets.  
 
Table 16: Cournot vs Forward 
Cournot 
 Inexperienced Experienced
Duopoly 
(% of 2-Cournot) 
70 
(105) 
53 
(79.5) 
Quadropoly 
(% of 4-Cournot) 
84.58 
(105.7) 
81.58 
(102) 
Forward with Exogenous Close 
Duopoly 
 (% of 2-Cournot)
85.56 
(99.8) 
62.53 
(72.9) 
Quadropoly 
 (% of 4-Cournot)
99.85 
(101.7) 
76.84 
(78.3) 
Forward with Endogenous Close 
Duopoly 
 (% of 2-Cournot)
98.32 
(147) 
79.12 
(118.7) 
Quadropoly 
 (% of 4-Cournot)
103.23 
(129) 
(130) 
(162.5) 
 
Our quadropoly results are along the lines of Le-Coq and Orzen and show that 
the competitive effect of entry is robust to the introduction of experience in 
experimental Cournot oligopolies. That is, the effect of market entry on competition is 
of a greater magnitude than the introduction of forward markets. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
A lot of legend surrounds the effect of the introduction of forward markets on 
market competitiveness. They are widely used and little understood. Depending upon 
the model, theory provides results suited to all tastes. The introduction of forward 
markets can have pro- and anti- competitive effects. The scant experimental (Le-Coq 
and Orzen (2006) and Brandts et al. (2008)) and empirical (Wolak, 2000) literature 
points indicates that the introduction of forward markets can result in competitive 
outcomes. 
As in Le-Coq and Orzen we study the strategic motive of the firms to sell in 
forward markets. Our design has some important differences from them. First, we 
randomly match firms vs. the fixed matching rule adopted in Le-Coq and Orzen. 
Second, we run our experiments for a longer duration. We hope that subject 
understanding of the market structure is improved with longer experiments. Thirdly, as 
a robustness check, we re-run the experiments with subjects experienced in the forward 
market trading institution. Finally, we also tested a design with an undefined number of 
periods of forward markets. 
Three main results emerge from our experiments. First, we find that experienced 
subjects are less competitive than inexperienced ones. Second, an implementation of the 
infinite opening version of forward markets (endogenous close rule) results in more 
competitive outcomes. It seems that the prisoners’ dilemma nature of the strategic 
motive is better captured by such a structure. Thirdly, we find that with experienced 
subjects the effect of entry (number of firms) on increasing market competitiveness is 
greater than the introduction of the forward markets. Over time subjects learn to avoid 
using forward markets and produce only in the spot market. 
Our most interesting result is for the case of the exogenous close duopoly and 
quadropoly. We find that both are much less competitive than theory and earlier 
experimental evidence indicate. Duopolies find it easy to coordinate actions and achieve 
a near monopoly outcome. Quadropolies are relatively more competitive, however, they 
are much less competitive than theory predicts. The use of forward markets by 
experienced subjects is minimal. Looking at data one sees that subjects first learn to 
avoid the use of the forward markets, and, then to reduce quantities in the spot market. 
Another interesting feature that distinguishes in-experienced and experienced 
subjects is that there is greater volatility in the behavior of experienced subjects. Table 
17 shows the variances of total quantities. In all cases the variance of the experienced 
subjects is significantly higher than the variance of the inexperienced ones. 
 
Table 17:Variance 
 Duo-Exog. Quad-Endog. Duo-Endo. Quad-Endo.
No Experience 66.09 73.96 10.76 71.4 
Experience 76.03 87.98 247.43 414.93 
p-value for equal variances 
(F-test) 
0.00858 
(1.15) 
0.00389 
(1.18) 
0 
(22.99) 
0 
(5.8) 
 
We also report new results for our implementation of a design with potentially 
infinitely many periods of forward markets (endogenous close rule). Compared with 
two forward markets (exogenous close) we find that the infinite forward market 
(endogenous close) scenario is much more competitive. In such an environment subjects 
find it had to coordinate actions, much more so when the number of players is four. In 
the endogenous close scenario, subjects have more opportunity to stake a position and 
to punish deviators that use the forward market. To do so: one is always certain that 
there will be another forward market period after any position is taken. However, it 
seems that to have more opportunities to deviate from collusive behavior is more 
important than to have opportunities to punish deviators. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Figures A.1 and A.2 show the evolution in the use of forward and spot markets for both 
unexperienced and experienced quadropolies in the endogenous close case. Table A.1 
shows the changes between the first and the last 10 rounds, and shows no significant 
difference. 
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Figure A.1 
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Figure A.2 
 
 4 Endog.No exp. 4 Endog. Exper.
First 10 104.38 143.10 
Last 10 103.07 123.67 
% Change -1.25 -13.58 
   
p-value  w/ one tail
(T-test) 
0.35 
(0.38) 
0.025 
(1.96) 
 
Table A.1 
APPENDIX 2 
 
Instructions for in-experienced subjects. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Introduction: This is a study of decision-making. Funding for this project has been provided by 
public funding agencies. If you follow these instructions, and make decisions carefully, you 
might earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid IN CASH at the end of today's 
session. 
 
Important: At any stage you can raise your hand to ask any question relating to 
the experiment. 
 
Overview: In today's session each of you is a quantity-setting seller. There are TWO sellers in 
each market. The experiment is made up of several weeks. Each week is made up of three 
trading days. You will be randomly and anonymously matched against other opponents. 
  
Trading in each week proceeds as follows:  
 
Each week is made up of three days. Note that, the total of the offers made in all the days 
constitute a commitment to sell a good and are final. In each day you make profits for the 
quantities sold in that day only. 
 
First Day:
In the first day you will have 30 seconds to make quantity offers. Note that, once 
confirmed all offers to sell are FINAL and cannot be changed. At the end of the day you will be 
able to see the quantities offered by the other seller, the price, and your profits for the day. 
 
Second Day: 
You may choose, or not, to increase upon the offer you made in the first day. You will 
have 30 seconds to make quantity offers. Any change can only be an increase over the total 
quantity offered in day-1. At the end of the day you will be able to see the quantities offered by 
the other seller, the price, and your profits for the day (only for the additional quantity sold 
in this day). 
 
Final Day: 
This is the final day of the week. You may choose, or not, to increase the offer you 
made in the first two days. Any change can only be an increase over the total quantity offered in 
days -1 and -2. At the end of the day you will be able to see the quantities offered by the other 
seller, the price, and your profits for the day (only for the additional quantity sold in this 
day). 
 
You can offer to sell quantity in all, or any, of the days. The price received by sellers is the 
same for everyone.  
 
• The market price in Day 1 is determined by the sum total of quantity offered by ALL 
sellers during that day and a computer estimate of the quantity that will be sold on 
Day 2 and the Final Day.  
• The market price in Day 2 is determined by the sum total of quantity offered by ALL 
sellers during Days 1 and 2 and a computer estimate of the quantities for the Final 
Day.  
 
Example 1 below explains how the price is determined in the Final day. 
 
Example 1: Let the market demand be P=10-TQ (P = market price, TQ = total quantity offered 
by all sellers). Suppose you offered to sell ZERO units on day-1, ONE additional unit on 
day-2, and ONE on Final day. The sum total of the units offered by you then is 2 (=1+1). 
Let us also suppose that the number of units offered by the other seller on day 1 is 1,  1 
on day 2, and ZERO on the Final Day. The total quantity (TQ) offered by all sellers across the 
week then is (3+2=) 5. This implies that the market price for the Final Day is P = 10-TQ = 10-5 
= 5. 
 
Note that the price declines as the total quantity offered (TQ) increases. For all TQ 
greater than, or equal to, 10 the market price (P=10-TQ=10-10=0) is zero. Further note that, 
the market price can never be negative. 
 
Example 2 below explains the relationship between the total quantity offered (TQ) and the 
market price in the Final Day (P). 
Example 2: Notice that the market price (P=10-TQ) decreases as the total quantity (TQ) sold in 
the market increases. The table below gives some possible prices for the Final Day for different 
total quantities (TQ): 
 
Market demand: P=10-TQ 
QUANTITY (TQ) PRICE (P) 
1 P = 10-1 = 9 
2 P = 10-2 = 8 
4 P = 10-4 = 6 
6 P = 10-6 = 4 
7 P = 10-7 = 3 
8 P = 10-8 = 2 
9 P = 10-9 = 1 
10 P = 10-10 = 0 
 
 
Procedures for trading are explained in more detail below. 
 
 1. Sellers earn profits by selling units. The profit for any unit sold is the selling price minus 
the cost of the unit. The selling price will be the same for all units, as will be unit costs. 
Thus a seller’s total profit is; 
 
Profits in the Final Day = (Selling Price – Unit Cost) × Number of units sold in the Final Day 
  
 2. Buyers. The buyers are automated. The price is determined according to the demand in 
Example-1. Given total quantity (TQ), the market price P=10-TQ. In our example TQ=5, 
this implies that P = 10-TQ = 10-5 = 5. 
  
 Note that the same demand will not be used in the experiment. 
 
In Days 1 and 2, the price is computed by the computer. As explained before the computer 
estimates the quantity that will be sold on Day 2 and the Final Day.  
 
Before you confirm your quantity for the day, you can practice with different quantities for 
yourself and for the other seller (to have an estimate of the effects on your profits of the total 
quantity offered that day). 
 
There are several important things to understand. 
 
- The higher (lower) is the total quantity (TQ), the lower (higher) is the price (P)  
(see TABLE in Example 2 above). 
- Your sales are affected by the quantities chosen by the other seller. The higher 
(lower) is the other seller’s quantity lower (higher) is the sales price. The same will 
be true if you increase your quantity and the other seller does not. 
 
- A higher quantity today may increase your profits today but may decrease 
profits later on in the week. 
 
 
The trading week: 
  
Each seller can offer to sell some quantity (or none) in each day of the week. While choosing 
the quantity you should keep in mind that, 
 
(i) you earn profits by selling units at a price above Unit Cost and  
(ii) the higher is total quantity, the lower is the sales price (see table above). 
(iii) you earn zero if you sell nothing. 
  
 
How to read the screen and submit your offer? 
 
On the right side of the screen, there is a history table. A record of all the plays is displayed in 
the table. 
 
On the left side of the screen, there is a graphical display section.  
 
You can try different possible combinations of your offer, the sum of all the other sellers offers 
and observe your potential profit on the right side of the display section. 
 
After you have decided your offer for that day, click the CONFIRM button. NOTE that 
whenever you click the CONFIRM button, you are confirming your offer only. The actual 
number of units offered by other sellers may be different from yours. Also, NOTE that you 
must click the CONFIRM button in order to submit your offer.  
 
The left side of the graphic display section shows your quantity, the sum of other sellers’ 
quantity and the profit given the price on a particular day.  
 
4) Overview: 
  
a) Today’s experiment will consist of a number of weeks. A trading week is made up of three 
days. The final trading week will not be disclosed in advance. 
 
b) Each of you can choose to offer a quantity for sale in any trading day. You will be randomly 
and anonymously matched against other opponents. 
 
c) In today’s experiment each one of you will have a Unit Cost of $X in each period. Each 
participant has identical Unit Costs, and Unit Costs are the same in all trading weeks. You are 
also informed about the other seller’s Unit Costs in a history table on the Right Side of the 
screen. 
 
d) You will be paid $X U.S. for every Y “experimental dollars” you earn in the market. Thus, 
for example, every Y experimental dollars equals $U.S. Your total earnings for today’s session 
will be the sum of your earnings in the experiment, plus your appearance fee. 
 
e) Some participants may make their quantity decisions earlier than others. If you make your 
decision before other sellers, please wait quietly while others finish. The monitor will make sure 
that there are no unnecessary delays. 
 
f) Please note that, talking with, or looking at, other participants is not allowed. The market will 
be closed and all participants will be dismissed without further payment if any participant 
communicates in any way other than the manner described in these instructions. 
 
g) At the end of the experiment you will be called out and your earning will be paid to you in 
cash. 
 
You will now practice before you start the experiment. Please free feel to continue the practice 
until you are ready for the experiment. Please click on “Ready to Practice” if you fully 
understand the instruction. 
APPENDIX 3 
 
Instructions for experienced subjects 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Exogenous close. A&V. 
 
Decisión making: 
 
In this game you will be choosing to sell quantities of a good in different inter-related 
periods. You may sell in any or all the days in the FIRST PART and a FINAL DAY.  
 
The price in the FINAL DAY is determined by the quantity sold in ALL the periods 
(quantity offered in all periods in the FIRST PART+FINAL DAY). 
 
How does the market work? 
 
Suppose that ALL sellers (including you) offer to sell a total of 50 in all the periods. Let 
us suppose that the market demand is P = 100-Q. 
 
1) PRICE IN THE FINAL DAY: 
 
The price in the FINAL DAY is determined by the TOTAL QUANTITY offered by all 
sellers in all the days. 
 
Then the price in the FINAL DAY is, P=100-50=50. 
 
As mentioned earlier you can offer to sell units anytime in the FIRST PART. 
 
Prices in the different days of the FIRST PART are determined differently than in 
the FINAL DAY.  
 
How are prices determined in the (different) days of the First Part? 
 
2) FIRST PART. 
 
Day 1: 
• First, note that quantity offered by all sellers in the first day decreases the 
demand in the Second and the FINAL DAY. 
• Example: If ALL sellers offer 20 on Day 1, then the remaining demand for Day 
2/Final Day is; P = 100-Q-20 = 80-Q. 
• A smaller demand in future days implies a lower price in the future. 
• How is price determined in the FIRST DAY? 
• Recall that the TOTAL QUANTITY sold determines the price only in the 
FINAL DAY. 
• Now, a total quantity of 20 is offered on Day 1. To determine the price the 
computer makes an estimate of the quantity all sellers will sell on Day 2 and the 
FINAL Day. 
• The price you obtain on Day 1 of the first part then depends upon what all 
sellers offer to sell (20, in this case) PLUS the computer’s estimate of the 
quantity sold in ALL future days. Let us suppose that this estimate is 25. 
• The price in Day 1 is then: P1 = 100-(20+25) = 55 (where 25 is the estimate of 
the quantity sold by everyone in all the future days). 
• Note, the higher is the quantity sold in the earlier periods, the smaller is the 
computer estimate of the total quantity sold in the future periods. 
 
Day 2: 
• Now suppose that all sellers offer to sell 6 units on Day 2. 
• The computer estimates of the total quantity sold on the Final Day will now be 
smaller (recall that the demand after Day 1 is also smaller; P = 80-Q) 
• Let us suppose that the Computer Estimate of the total quantity sold on the 
Final Day is 15. 
• Total quantity sold in (Day 1 + Day 2 + Computer Estimate) = (20+6+15) 
• The price on Day 2 will then be, P2 = 80-(6+15) = 80-21 = 59 
 
Final day: 
 
• First note that the demand on the Final Day is P = 100-(Quantity First 
Day+Quantity Second Day) = 100-(20+15)-Q = 100-35-Q = 65-Q. 
• If you offer to sell 5 on the Final Day and OTHER sellers offer to sell 5. Then 
the price and profit on the Final Day will be: 
• P = 65-(Quantity First Day+Quantity Second Day+Quantity Final Day) = 65-
(20+15+10) = 65-45 = 20. 
• Your profits in the Final Day will then be = (Price-Cost)xQuantity = (20-10)x5 
= 50. 
 
About the Computer estimate: A tutorial will show you how the computer makes 
estimations after the instructions. 
 
Your total profits are the sum of the profits from Day 1, Day 2 and the Final Day. 
 
Recall:  
 
1) The price in the FINAL DAY is determined by the TOTAL QUANTITY offered 
by all sellers in all the days. 
2) The price in the First Part is always determined by the computer estimate of total 
sales in the future days. This implies that for the same quantity offered in the 
First Day, or only offering to sell in the Final Day, the price on Day 1 is going to 
be smaller. 
3) The same units give more profits if they are sold in latter days. 
4) The same units give fewer profits if some units were already sold in the past 
days. 
5) The higher is the quantity sold in the earlier periods, the smaller is the computer 
estimate of the total quantity sold in the future periods. 
APPENDIX 4 
 
Tutorial for experienced subjects 
 
Tutorial (Print out to be given to the subjects)  
 
2-poly 
Exogenous close. A&V. 
 
Lesson 1: The same units give more profits if they are sold in latter days. 
 
Example 1.1: In days 1 and 2 please make an offer of 0 units for yourself and 0 units for 
others. In the Final Day please enter 18 units for yourself and 22 units for others. You 
will notice that the price is 20 and that your profits are 380. 
 
How do we obtain the price? 
 
When the units are sold only in the last day, the price is determined by the demand P = 
60 – Q, where Q is the sum of the quantities sold IN ALL DAYS, and P is the price. In 
the example, Q = 18+22 = 40 and P = 60-40 = 20. Your profits are 20x18 = 360. 
 
The following table shows the price in the Final Day as a result of total units sold (in all 
days). 
 
Sum of units sold in   Price in  
ALL DAYS   FINAL DAY 
 
0    60 
5    55 
10    50 
15    45 
20    40 
25    35 
30    30 
35    25 
40    20 
45    15 
50    10 
55    5 
60    0 
 
Example 1.2: In Day 1 please make an offer of 0 units for yourself and 0 units for 
others. In Day 2 make an offer of 18 units for yourself and enter 22 units for others. 
Notice that the price is now 6.7 and that your profits are 120.6. Enter zeros for the final 
day. 
 
How do we obtain the price? 
 
When 40 units are sold in Day 2 (18 by you, 22 by others), the computer estimates a 
new demand for the Final Day P = 60 – 40 – Q = 20 – Q. Then, the computer makes an 
estimate of the quantity that will be sold in the Final Day, which in this case is 13.3. 
This gives us the price P = 20 – 13.3 = 6.7. The quantities in Day 2 are sold at this price. 
Your profits in Day 2 are 6.7 x 18 = 120.6. 
 
The following table shows the price for Day 2 based on the units sold on Day 1 and Day 
2 AND the computer estimate of total units sold in the Final Day. 
 
Sum of units sold in   Price for units sold in 
DAYS 1 and 2  DAY 2 
 
0    20 
5    18.3 
10    16.7 
15    15 
20    13.3 
25    11.7 
30    10 
35    8.3 
40    6.7 
45    5 
50    3.3 
55    1.7 
60    0 
 
The price at which quantities are sold in the FINAL DAY depends on quantities sold in 
all days by yourself and the others. Further, these quantities may be different from the 
computer’s estimation. 
 
In this example, sales in Day 1 and the Final Day are zero. Thus, total sales (in ALL 
DAYS) are 0 + 40 + 0 = 40. Then, the actual price in Final Day is P = 60 – 40 = 20. 
Your profits in Final Day are 20 x 0 = 0. 
 
Example 1.3: In Day 1 please make an offer of 18 units for yourself and 22 units for 
others. Notice that the price is 4 and that your profits are 72. Enter zeros for the other 
days. 
 
Why is this?  
 
When 40 units are sold in Day 1 (18 by you, 22 by others), the computer estimates a 
new demand of, P = 60 – 40 – Q = 20 – Q, for Day 2 and the Final Day. Given this, the 
computer makes an estimate of the quantity that will be sold both in Day 2 and the Final 
Day. In our example this implies a total quantity of 8 in Day 2 and 8 in the Final Day. 
 
Thus, the estimated price in Day 2 and in the Final Day is P = 60 – 40 – 8- 8 = 4. This is 
the price used to compute profits in Day 1. You profits in Day 1 are 4 x 18 = 72. 
 
As before, the actual prices for Day 2 and Final Day will be different if you or the 
others choose to sell a different number of units in Day 2 and Final Day. This will not 
change the price and profits for Day 1. 
 
The following table shows the price for Day 1 based on the units sold on Day 1 AND 
the computer estimate of total units sold in Day 2 and the Final Day. 
 
Sum of units sold in   Price for units sold in 
DAY 1   DAY 1 
 
0    12 
5    11 
10    10 
15    9 
20    8 
25    7 
30    6 
35    5 
40    4 
45    3 
50    2 
55    1 
60    0 
 
Lesson 2: The same units give fewer profits if some units were already sold in the 
first few days. 
 
Example 2.1: In Days 1 and 2 enter 0 units for yourself and 0 units for others. In the 
Final Day enter 20 units for yourself and 20 units for others. Notice that the price is 20 
and that your profits are 400. 
 
Example 2.2: In Day 1 enter 0 units for yourself and 0 units for others. In Day 2 enter 5 
units for yourself and 5 units for others (see that price is 16.7 and your profits are 83.3 
for Day 2.) In the Final Day enter 20 units for yourself and 20 units for others. Notice 
that the price now is 10 and that your profits in the Final Day are 200. (Compare this 
with the profit of 400 in the previous example.) 
 
Lesson 3: It may pay to produce in days 1 and 2. 
 
Example 3.1: In Days 1 and 2 enter 0 units for yourself and 0 units for others. In the 
Final Day enter 24 units for others. Now try entering different units for yourself. You 
will notice that the number of units that give you the maximum profits in the Final Day 
is 18. Profits with this quantity are 324. 
 
Example 3.2: In Day 1 enter 0 units for yourself and 0 units for others. In Day 2 enter 10 
units for yourself and 0 units for others. (Notice that the price is 16.7 and your profits 
for Day 2 are 166.7.) In the Final Day enter 24 units for others and 14 units for yourself. 
Notice that the price now is 14 and that your profits in the Final Day are 168. Your total 
profits are 166.7 + 168 = 334.7, more than the 324 you got in the previous example. 
 
Note that you made more profits because others chose to sell nothing in Day 2. 
 
